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Moving beyond the global war on terror: Security developments in Somalia  




The tragic events of 911 paved the way for Horn of Africa’s reentrance into the forefront of 
the global conflict and security debates. The horrific attacks emanating from Afghanistan 
had major consequences for the Horn, particularly Somalia. Apart from sharing common 
colonial history and traditional clan structured societies, Afghanistan and Somalia share 
numerous similarities. Both countries represent an extreme form of failed states and with 
regard to development the two Muslim countries repeatedly occupy at the bottom of 
global development indicators1. In addition the countries suffer from protracted civil wars 
exacerbated by hatred invested local armed factions that seem to enjoy and see no 
alternatives to widespread lawlessness.  
In the past the Horn was, more or less voluntarily, drawn into a different but not lesser 
vicious global politics. During the cold war superpower rivalry, with pronounced 
geopolitical motivations, fostered alliances with state elites in the region. The Americans 
and Soviets fiercely competed for access to important strategic locations. They did this by 
securing formal cooperation from the Authoritarian regimes. In return the two countries 
donated modern weaponry and military training.  
The renewed interest this time aims, at least officially, beyond accessibility to vital 
strategic locations. The declared objectives include pursuing potential fugitives allegedly 
seeking refuge in the region, especially in unstable Somalia with the assumption that this 
country represents a legitimate governance and security threat not only to the region but 
to the wider international system. This shift of strategy appears to be an integral part of 
the wider dominant discourse of the emerging political economy of danger (Lacher, 2008). 
Ideally the international political system consists of more or less sovereign states or 
entities with some sort of internal and external legitimacy. Practically the world is 
hierarchically structured presenting numerous security challenges and dilemmas (Vinci, 
2008).   
This paper discusses the rationale behind the global war on terror and the incorporation of 
the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia where the war caused serious socio-economic and 
political setbacks. Apart from killing thousands of innocent people, internally and 
externally displacing millions and devastating public infrastructure, the paper argues that 
the war negatively impacted the locally generated successful reconciliation processes. In 
the past decade an increasingly successful vibrant civil society succeeded achieving 
                                                 
1. 1 http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 
quantifiable gains in promoting a bottom up political culture and system (Menkhaus, 




The concept of terrorism  
 
The concept of terrorism refers to the premeditated use of threat or the obvious 
application of violence and intimidation for the purpose of obtaining political or social 
objectives2. It remains controversial though of which actions constitute a terrorist act, 
which initiates and sponsorships may lead to a possible terror operation. Does an act of 
terrorism equal a war? Obviously proponents of an eternal global religious conflict insist 
that terrorist incidents represent a real global war between good and evil and civilized 
contra barbaric etc.   
Depending on who interprets, in given situation and circumstance, different forms of 
terrorism with multiple legitimacy and methods of applications exist. There are terrorist 
acts inspired by previous acts of revolutionary terrorism, a description originating from 
the French revolution. There are also those that conduct some sort of racial terrorism, 
which is associated with the activities conducted by the brutal apartheid regime in South 
Africa. In between the two one finds a religiously inspired terrorism. Some analysts 
classify terror activities into a heroic terrorism, a legitimate action for fighting national 
freedom and understandable cause with the application of acceptable methods, and 
horrific terrorism, an illegitimate action of terror with ignoble means (Mazrui, 2006). 
People who fight for self-determination and independence through armed resistance 
conduct heroic terrorism, while self-proclaimed individuals and groups who spread 
anxiety and death among civilians carry our horrific terrorism.                   
Furthermore the concept of terrorism appears dynamic and multi-dimensional. In the past 
we saw that the terrorists of today can become the freedom fighters, or possibly the peace 
makers, of tomorrow. The Mandela and Arafat cases are good examples of formerly 
western designated terrorists turning Nobel laureates. Conversely former western trained 
and funded so-called freedom fighters from the era of the cold war transformed 
themselves into intimidating lethal global terrorists. Al-Qaida and associates qualify this 
description.    
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War rationale and implications    
 
The media simplistically depicts the ongoing conflict as an aggression initiated by fanatic 
young Arab terrorists that masterminded and executed a devastating daring attack against 
the most powerful nation in the world in 911 2001. With its vast military, economic and 
political power America wields enormous power that affects much of the world (Sterling, 
2008). The country has therefore a legitimate right to respond and defend its sovereignty. 
Initially most of the world, including the Muslim world, sympathized with the people of 
America in condemning the 9/11 attacks as an unforgivable crime against humanity 
(Rehman, Javaid, Ghosh, Saptarshi, 2008). For Muslims an act of terrorism is by nature 
anti-Islamic and is strongly forbidden in the holy teachings.  
 
The problem is that it is difficult to assess and draw conclusions on still unfolding conflict 
(Witt, Matthew T., deHaven-Smith, Lance, 2008). Most will, however, argue that the war in 
Afghanistan was justified as the alleged terrorists and their sponsors resided and operated 
from this war torn country. The initial response by the Americans was understandable as 
the UN unanimously approved the American response. But in order to get the whole 
picture, one needs to closely examine the structural challenges and uncertainties the world 
experienced during the post cold war period.  
Following the collapse of the bipolar world system, America imposed a uni-polar system 
that presumed western hegemony convincing America to pursue a unilateral world order. 
On the rhetorical side proclamations, such as the end of history and the clash of 
civilization, superficially placed the liberal western world vision at the centre of global 
military and economic power. This liberal approach justified U.S. primacy and had 
uncritically acquired the blessing of the media elites (Rojecki, Andrew, 2008). In response 
marginalized global constituents, with more or less legitimate grievances, decided to 
challenge the status que of the balance of power.       
In addition the ambition of personal exclusive gains fueled the conduct of this war. For 
instance, since the early days of the war on terror the insurance industry and other 
privately owned firms played an instrumental role in the management of the global war 
on terror (Aradau, Claudia; van Munster, Rens, 2008). The unilateral declaration of 
superiority led to the rise of religious extremism which America in past supported to 
undermine the Soviets. The conflict also introduced mounting Islam phobic sentiments in 
the west (Panagopoulos, Costas, 2006) 
Therefore the so-called war on terror reflects the failure of the presumed American 
dominated global order. The conflict not only immensely derailed world peace for decades 
but also introduced a political economy of danger in the form of global anxiety and 
constant surveillance that the world will have to deal with for generations.  
Another important aspect is that the war was offensively marketed by mutually 
antagonists as having a global scope. Closer inspection, however, reveals that this is not 
the case as the conflict concentrates on certain regions and countries- with expanded focus 
on security and surveillance in the west. Most of the actual operations and the subsequent 
suffering of innocent civilians take place in developing countries, particularly in the 
Muslim world (Menkhaus, Ken, 2007). So the burden of the war appears not fairly 
distributed. In terms of human loss and displacement similar obvious difference prevail 
between countries belonging to the core vs. periphery, Muslims Vs. non-Muslims. For 
instance major frontlines situate in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, with severe 




Expanding the war to the Horn-Somalia   
 
The Horn, one of the most impoverished corners of the world, abruptly acquired the so-
called “third front status” of the war on terror. For Afghanistan, terrorists allegedly 
planned attacks from there. As far as Iraq is concerned an unpredictable dictator, with 
possible WMD, might invite a preemptive strike. For the Horn political economists of fear 
projected the region as potentially hosting fugitives committed to create an alternative 
“jihad factory” in the region. The main argument was that a lawless Somalia, a country 
without government, could be exploited as a terrorist base. For the incorporation of the 
Horn, and thereby Somalia, into the war, a concerted discourse leveling the three Muslim 
countries, Somalia-Sudan-Yemen, as the Red Sea tri-angle of terror emerged. Obviously no 
empirical evidence supported the propagation that the Horn of Africa represented a direct 
and immediate threat to the US or its Western allies. On the other hand, the region, or at 
least Somalia, had partially contributed to the distraction of the post cold war American 
order. Popularly the Somalis consider the terror paradigm against the region as revenge 
against the Somalis on the failed American military mission in Mogadishu in 19923. 
Furthermore Somalia locates in a key strategic region providing proximity to the Gulf and 
international sea ways.  
 
 
Developments in Somalia 
 
America’s more or less deliberate mischievous acts in Somalia include the US’s support of 
the military dictatorship in Somalia in the 1980s and Bush senior and Clintons failed 
intervention in 1993 (Alexander, 1994). Following the devastating Somali civil war, some 
autonomous and relatively stable Somali regions emerged. Somaliland and Puntland had 
through bottom up civil society mechanism managed to build regional administrations, 
while Mogadishu and some parts in the South experienced the intensification of violence 
(Piles, 1993). Despite the systemic brutality by warlords in Southern Somalia, resilient 
                                                 
3. 3 Interview with a Somali Diaspora focus group in Arhus-Denmark, february 2009 
Somalis filled the vacuum in creating an environment of entrepreneurship and businesses 
expansion. This has raised the speculation that the anarchy may after all not be bad for 
Somalia's development. The Eurocentric state system remained always alien to Africa and 
dictatorships never improved welfare but abused and reduced the common wellbeing. In 
Somalia the government's collapse and subsequent emergence of statelessness opened the 
opportunity for Somalia progressing, making many parts of the country better off with 
renewed vibrancy of critical sectors of the economy (Leeson, 2006). Furthermore 
significant changes have occurred in the nature and intensity of conflict in Somalia. Since 
mid 1990s conflicts became more localized and less bloody due to criminality constraining 
mechanism based on  customary law and private security forces (Menkhaus, 2006).  
   
The year 2009 began with some improvements and optimism. Two years of brutal 
invasion and oppression by the authoritarian regime in Addis and its allied Somali 
warlords ended after sustained legitimate insurgency by various Somali groups. For the 
population the cost was huge. About 18.000 killed and millions displaced internally and 
externally. On the Ethiopian side, apart from the economic expenses, unannounced 
number of Ethiopian Soldiers perished.  
 
It remains a mystery why the regime in Addis suddenly decided to abandon its closely 
allied Somali warlords. Obviously the change of administration in Washington is relevant. 
The Obama administration declared its intension to focus on domestic challenges and 
reiterated its careful reexamination of its involvement in international wars. From this 
perspective the new American administration alters the US’s and UN’s hitherto 
approaches in viciously undermining this impoverished and suffering region. Many of the 
troubles that confront countries such as Somalia could have been internally manageable if 
the so-called American initiated Operation Restore Hope and the discredited UNISOM 
efforts never took place. The proliferation of warlords and arms were the obvious outcome 
of these failed operations.  
 
Following the American involvement coupled with the Ethiopian invasion, terrorist 
incidents in Somalia become frequent, including actions that target local civilians and 
humanitarian agencies.  In October 2008, radical groups conducted deadly terrorist acts in 
Hargeisa, the capital city of Somaliland and in the coastal town Bosaaso, the economic 
capital of the autonomous region of Puntland. Whoever committed these horrendous 
crimes had no respect for anyone and any region whether in the south or in the north. 
Governmental offices and UN agencies were targeted. Most of those killed were innocent 
civilians. Prior to the current political and economic unrest Boosaaso was close to be called 
the Beirut (the old Beirut) of the Horn of Africa. Similarly Hargeisa attracted Somalis from 
all regions and from the Diaspora. With substantial Somali cosmopolitan presence in 
Hargeysa, the terror had no further implications as irrational sentiments were controlled 
by the civil society. Most Somalis considered the attacks against the invading Ethiopian 
army as legitimate heroic act while they agree on their condemnation of terror attacks 
against civil targets as illegitimate act of horrific terrorism.     
 
Some elements (estimated less than a 1000 individuals) in the resistance movement could 
be extremely dangerous not only for the international system but also for the attempts by 
other Somalis to establish viable political and economic system. It is here where the UN 
and other western organizations are actively fueling the conflict. They continue to provide 
funds for the predatory warlords. Even the recently Djibouti agreement that constructed 
the new Somali leadership is not sincere. Here the UN unilaterally dictated the imposition 
of the so-called moderates and empowered them to occupy higher positions of the 
transnational government. If the US, EU and UN stay involved we might see renewed 
violence. Empirical facts on the ground in Somalia suggest that external involvement has 
been and continues to be the main source of obstacle for lasting peace in Somalia. All the 
locally working solutions in Somalia (North-Central-South) were created by non-
donorised indigenous traditional-religious constituents. 
 
In the past few months a process to de-radicalize conservative armed elements and 
incorporate them into some sort of power sharing is taking off from the ground. Whether a 
western funded reconciliation initiatives to build bridges between armed secular groups 
and radical religious movements is an open question. Recently in a BBC interview the 
conservative Somali cleric Sheikh Aweys in Asmara insisted that there will be no peace as 
long as external actors are involved. Islamists in Somalia consider the internal Somali 
conflict as a minor issue, easily solvable as soon the external challenge is no more. They 
confidently state that there exists no major impenetrable conflict among the Somalis. Even 
the idea that Somalis cannot resolve their problems is an external invention and myth, 
they insist. They know most Somalis are anti-colonial and anti-subordination; therefore in 
exploiting this fact the Somali Islamists have a rational a case. Many Somalis are, 
nonetheless, not fans of Sheikh Aweys, a man hunted by US security agencies, but in this 
decisive period of Somali history, this aging military officer who turned Sheikh has some 
legitimate and consistent arguments. He holds fast on the idea that all Somalis are 
Muslims; Islamic principles should therefore rule Somalia. Only through this process will 
Somalis be able to eliminate clanism and recurring anarchy. Due to the prolonged civil 
war many people, including probably the Sheikh himself, might qualify to be criminals, 
but internally, when the country is under siege and occupation, people remain united and 
direct attention to the bigger external enemies. When external oppression and interference 
ends, Somalis could either choose to bring justice to those that committed crimes or 
instead chose to pursue forgiveness and national reconciliation, or possibly combine both.  
Even in advanced democratic societies, internal division and opposition is normally 
suspended or ignored during periods of external threat and challenge.  
During a short period of 6 months Aweys and Islamic Courts Union (ICU) succeeded to 
stop years of senseless violence in some parts of Southern Somalia. There is no reason to 
object why they would not be able to repeat the success, if external actors- particularly 
those with anti-Islamic sentiments, refrain interference in Somalia.  
 
The newly elected Somali president generated internal and external debate on whether he 
is up to the task. Sheikh Sharif could be a prominent respected leader in Somalia if clanism 
and anarchy is contained. Due to probably his Islamic scholarship and urban background, 
he appears not infected by vicious clanism and corruption, two major qualities that any 
potentially successful Somali leader must not possess. In addition Sharif belongs to a 
generation that is fortunate on one hand and unfortunate on the other. It is a generation 
that grew up during a revolutionary Somalia with relative security and free education in 
their mother tongue. In other ways they are very unfortunate as due to the successive 
corrupt older generations such as warlords Aidid , Yusuf, Ali Mahdi and many others, 
never bothered providing younger generations with peaceful transition and progressive 
upward mobility. 
 
Two years ago, two arrogant men, Bush and Malez grossly underestimated (despite 
recurring internal instability and civil war) the capability of Somali people to defend their 
country. At least it seems that the new administration in Washington learned a lesson by 
slowly transforming the baseless rhetoric of the so-called war on global terrorism. Clearly 
Obama is an American and he will pursue American interests, but his administration is 
already changing relations with the outside world, particularly with the Muslim world. 
For instance he suggested the closure of Guantanamo prison, withdrawal from Iraq, that 
he will not support the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia. In an interesting move his 
administration recognized and congratulated the election of Sheikh Sharif (an Islamist 
leader with Islamist movement that America considered jihadist fought battles against). 
Recently in an exclusive interview with Al-Arabia satellite TV, Obama stated that he 
understands the Muslims as he, as a child, lived and went to school in Indonesia. Of 
course it will take more than one man to genuinely transform the American political 
culture/system but Obama is a new type of leader as Sheikh Sharif is, therefore it is 
possible that they will make some sort of difference.  
 
With the election of Sheikh Sharrif Somalia is heading towards a positive direction. The 
only way to prevent Somalia from becoming a fertile ground for international terrorist 
groups is to help stabilize the country. In order to achieve this objective, it is crucial to 
adopt initiatives aiming at strengthening Somalia's civil society (Tripodi, 2005).  
 
The war on terror was an unjust war. Apart from the human cost- mass death and 
displacement, countries invaded and destroyed- political and economic setbacks 
aggravated. More seriously warlords and authoritarian rulers adopted and employed the 
war rhetoric for power consolidation. At the regional level animosities were created (prior 
to the war, migration and border businesses flourished with people in the region 
interacting).  
 
Most damaging so far is the disruption of the locally created indigenous Somali order 
during the post state collapse. Through the combination of Xeer- Somali customary laws- 
and Sharia to resolve and mange local disputes, many parts of the country adopted and 
established a relative peace. Within the framework of the new terrorist paradigm, 
respected civil society groups in Somalia and beyond were accused of potential terrorists. 
At the same time warlords received clandestine funding and became important members 
of the alliances of willing (Dagne, 2002).  The war on terror took extremism and 
radicalization among the Somalis into higher levels, especially the growing concern 
among the youth and Diasporas, posing serious future challenges4.    
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4.  
Concluding remarks  
 
The conflict in Somalia remains complex to understand and thereby intricate to resolve. In 
order to overcome pressing issues involved actors need to sincerely cooperate and 
compromise. At the moment the region needs a new approach different from the 
destructive and discredited past of colonialism, dictatorship and unilateral wars. With a 
new administration in Washington, at least the political rhetoric might change from a war 
and power driven intimidation to a more nuanced thinking of international relations.  
 
The Somalis need an opportunity and space to consider and construct their destiny. 
Interestingly the few occasions in the past the Somalis experienced noninterference they 
resolved their disagreements peacefully (the case Puntland, Somaliland, Islamic courts 
period illustrate this success). These positive locally initiated developments occurred 
when the attention of the world was not focused in Somalia. In addition no rational 
explanation for the Somali conflict exists (been homogeneous nation) except for the 
recurring factionalism linked to external involvement and sponsorship.  
 
Most observers agree that Somalis have now, in the form of relatively young enlightened 
leadership, coupled with people been tired of conflicts and longing for peace, a better 
opportunity of finding lasting solutions. Obviously Somalia is not an island and 
international interest and interaction will continue but a positive external involvement will 
rather be complementary.  
 
Furthermore it seems that Somalis might be ready to embrace a form of an Islamic rule 
that many assume might restore social justice, moral ethics and legitimate power 
structure. Whether the international community equally accepts the Somali intensions and 
wishes remains doubtful. Similar to many other African countries, Somalis never had, in 
modern times, an opportunity to establish their own independent political structures. That 
is probably why all imposed structures failed. The time has come to let indigenous 
structured systems emerge. A progressive modern Islamic version might promote 
horizontal cohesion among the Somalis and help them overcoming past grievances. 
Paradoxically the obvious and most serious challenge to the approach of Islamic 
governance comes from the armed radical groups in the country. They want to assert an 
Islamic rule but preferably a version based on their own interpretations. These armed 
radical groups represent a minority in Somalia. Most of the Somalis belong to the Sufi 
branch of Islamic thought. 
 
Some observers view the situation in Somalia as serving as an exit political opportunity for 
the west to employ conflict resolution approach in reaching out Somali Islamists through 
political co-optation with the aim to disaggregate the global radical Islamic movement, 
active jihad and forge better relationship with the Islamic world (Stevenson, Jonathan, 
2007). 
 
Whatever legitimate or illegitimate concerns outsiders might have, statelessness, anarchy, 
extremism and mismanagement in Somalia could only be overcome if Somalis 
independently determine their destiny. In this endeavor the country needs to regroup and 
constructive use its scattered human capital among the Diaspora. A new transnational 
Diaspora incorporated developmental approach linked to the vibrant civil society and 
local administrative structures in the country would certainly constitute functioning 
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